Non-English Sources

I recall one History professor lamenting the lack of the non-English sources in the production of History. Based on anecdotal evidence this is true. This phenomenon is a great loss to any attempts at faithful reproduction of the past. One finds that the Chinese (confirmed by my Chinese Language colleague) and French interpretation of events more often than not differ from English world. Indeed, it was the French that came up with a more holistic (and interdisciplinary) historical study through the Annales School.  

My attempts to overcome this has led me to read a Chinese translation of the French book - Quand la Chine change le monde - (based on my French translation) When China changes the world. There are a few other Chinese books on Chinese economy on my desk. I hope to read them soon.

Chen Weilun -History Blogger     

[Comment] Book review - Afgantsy by Rodric Barithwaite (2011)

Late in 2011, I read the review about the above book from Newsweek magazine (12 Sep 2011 issue). The focus is on the proxy conflict of Afghanistan which the USSR invaded in 1979.

Written by the former British ambassador to the former Soviet Union (1988-1992; crossed referenced to 4 other sources including publisher Oxford University Press website), the book reduces the persuasiveness of US triumphalism (especially the Reagan subset) in ending the Cold War. It also brings a more complete picture as it relies Russian sources that were not translated into English as well as the author's first experience of the Soviet leadership.

The Soviets had already wanted to withdraw before US President Reagan and the US Central Intelligence Agency's decision to support the locals and foreign jihadis against the Soviets. In this sense, US actions prolonged and delayed the end of the Cold War - a brilliant counter argument to US triumphalism. The Soviets found it more difficult to pull out since they were in effect fighting for the reputation of Communism. They failed miserably in setting up or assisting a viable communist state like Cuba.

Another point adds strength to the Revisionist or Post-Revisionist school of thought in the Origins of the Cold War. Security fears; "..poor judgement, flawed intelligence and disastrous friends.."  were factors that drove the USSR into Afghanistan. It seems that the US or at least the "hawks" - the aggressive decision makers never gave peace enough of a chance. The West did not recognise consciously or unconsciously the desire for Soviet safety.

Finally, the book can suggest how Afghanistan broke the Soviet Union's back. Of the 620,00 troops, approximately 75% were hospitalised for diseases from hepatitis to malaria. This was on top of conscripts suffering at the hands of older soldiers. Yet, there was no honour for the surviving Soviet army. Only in 2009 was there remembrance of the deceased soldiers. The 'evil empire' label (from Reagan) on the USSR caused significant damage to the image of Communism and decreased the legitimacy of the Soviet leadership. My father told me Soviet mothers cried for their sons who were called 'invaders'. Their sons died, but not in the defence of the Mother Russia. The Islamic republics within the USSR were clamouring for independence. It was all down hill from then. Gorbachev, the young Soviet leader, was driving a car (USSR) with no brakes towards a cliff....

Chen Weilun - History Blogger

Booklist on Global Economy

Please note I have used the following books in the production of Lectures 1 and 2:

Title and Author	Location and Code	Focus Area(s)
David Reynolds, One World Divisible: Global History since 1945	Libaria, 909.82 Rey	Japan, South Korea and Taiwan Generally a good overall text
Henry C. Dethloff, The United States and the Global Economy since 1945	Libaria, 337.73 Det	United States prior to 1975
Sidney Pollard, The International Economy since 1945	Libaria, 940 Pol	Low inflation during the Golden Age of Capitalism (p.108) Multinational Companies Numbers for growth in passenger cars (p.21)

Updated 25 Nov 2011, Chen Weilun

Ronald Reagan-OPEC and the end of the Cold War

This is an entry to promote research US President Reagan's confrontational policies towards the USSR. Economically, it has been said that he persuaded OPEC to raise production to decrease oil prices. As the Soviet Union was an oil producer, this added to its economic strain on top of the grain embargo begun in 1979 by US president Carter for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The USSR was therefore deprived of funds to import technology and other goods. Reagan also banned technology transfer to the USSR. I recall that the US also restricted Japanese sales of computer technology to the USSR.

We can research on the numerical depth of the impact e.g. how much profits was lost. It is an interesting aspect of economic competition in the Cold War.

Chen Weilun

Interesting Question on US, UN and International Terorrism

Preparing for the topic and questions on International Terrorism has enriched with me wider perspective.

According to some sources, for example Linda Fasulo in her book "An Insider's guide to the United Nations" (pg 79-81), she states that tackling international terrorism only began to "claim major attention" in the United Nations (UN) from the 1990s. The increased globalisation (flow of people, funds and weapons) and religious fundamentalism highlighted the need to clamp down on the trend. Apparently, the push came from the US particularly on one UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 targetting the Taliban of Afghanistan. Other academic sources also state that Western nations were generally not excessively concerned with the issue as domestic terrorists like the Red Brigade in Italy came under control by the 1980s. Domestic laws and enforcement had restricted the negative impact.  The implication for this is that there was no great will to overcome the problem through the UN since the West made up 3 of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council.

To verify the reliability and accuracy of the above information, I went to read Thomas M. Magstadt's "Understanding Politics: Ideas, Institution and Issues." A US government survey estimated international terrorist events in 1985 at 635 while another organisation Risk International gave a figure of more than 3000. (pg 446) This contextual information provides a clearer picture of how relatively insignificant the international terrorist problem was to the US. This is further corroborated by the increased terrorist attacks (actual or attempted) on US soil and property. There were a total of 11 such incidents in the 1990s alone. US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed for instance in 1998 with 224 killed. Therefore, it seems safe to argue that the US was indeed responding to the heightened terrorist threat which was starting to seem out of control. As it remained as a superpower, it was able to drive through such initiatives.

And now, perhaps one can go on and study the past approaches and attitudes of the US towards terrorism before 1990. I gather it would both be useful and interesting to discover US policy in this respect.

Mr Chen

Bali and indirect colonial rule in Southeast Asia; and the value of Persisting

It was challenging to find information on the above island. Eventually, I found it at the travel guide section in Sembawang National Library. This was after trying eResources of National Library Board; the internet; the History Sections of various libraries as well as the Political Science sections. Similar information was found in several travel guides and other books I read thereby suggesting that it was reliable. Therefore I am publishing this.

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Bali was conquered by the Dutch with the aid of Moluccan (islands east of Java) soldiers by 1908-10. According to the Bali & Lombok: Pocket Guide (Berlitz, Singapore, 2010), the end of the Balinese resistance was essentially suicide. This horrified the Dutch back in the Netherlands and colonialism remained indirect with the rajas (kings) remaining in place . Its economy like that of Cambodia and Laos remained largely intact (and unexploited); Bali became a tourist spot from the 1920s. Its culture was likewise put in exhibitions in Europe partly to justify colonialism. This was supported the lack of nationalist leaders In fact one of the royalty like Prince Madé (born 1919) who chose to be a doctor and was in Europe getting the degree during World War Two. He spent much of his time serving in his profession outside of Indonesia instead. (His father received a car from the Dutch for instance.)

Therefore, nationalism did not grow as quickly or as strongly in Bali as in Java. Arguably, there was relatively less resentment overall. This came on radically though in the 1940s. By 1946, Balinese led by Ngurah Rai were were killed resisting the returning Dutch. Today, several memorials highlight their resting place.

One can also suggest the same result in Malaya as it was governed with the Sultans remaining in place. This very much contrasted the removal of the Burmese kings who were patrons of Buddhism in Burma. This led to the Young Men's Buddhist Association which sought to revive Burman culture and religion and later on the organisation gave rise to the General Council of Burmese Associations, a clear nationalist group with desires for independence.

Nevertheless, the deficient sense of nationalism in Malaya can also be attributed to the lack of education overall. Different ethnic groups managed their own schools prior to the 1920s without much central direction in Malaya; from the 1930s there was reorganisation of state led education in states like Johor which increased education in Johor. Further, only after 1945 did "parents become aware of the importance of education." (P. Lim Pui Huen, Johor: Local History, Local Landscapes 1855 to 1957, Straits Times Press, p. 161). Thus, it can be said that a combination of such factors prevented the origins of nationalism especially on a large scale or mass basis.

Mr. Chen

Minorities and Migrants as a factor in Southeast Asian nationalism

Here the role of Malayan Chinese, Indonesia Chinese as well as Malayan Indians are discussed.

The Chinese in Indonesia as described by Leo Suryadinata in his book "Peranakan's Search fo National Identity: Biographical Studies of Seven Indonesian Chinese" (Marshall Cavendish International, 2004) were not united on the concept of Indonesia. Even when the Dutch returned after 1945, those who stayed in the Dutch areas either remained neutral or sided with the Dutch. Pro-Dutch groups included the Chinese Union (Persatuan Tionghoa) in Jarkarta. (Note that this was on the island of Java). The Chinese in the Indonesian Republic often supported the Sukarno and nationalists. Thus, the lack of a united nationalist front impeded faster independence.

Likewise this happened in Malaya. The Chinese by and large remained loyal to China rather than Malaya. Of note, it was not until 1930 that the Malayan Communist Party was set up. Of course, this was in part created by world economic conditions of fall in tin and rubber prices especially during the 1930s Great Depression. The British tried to send back those who lost jobs but refused to give permanent land rights to remaining Chinese who went into farming. The Indians faced even stiffer challenges as there were caste differences and strikes in the 1930s against the upper classes. These made up two of the 3 ethnic groups in Malaya itself.   

In sum, nationalism failed to rise and grow due to the above circumstances. It should be no wonder that in particular with Malaya, nationalism became much more apparent only after 1945.

Mr Chen