Friday, November 25, 2011

Booklist on Global Economy

Please note I have used the following books in the production of Lectures 1 and 2:

Title and Author
Location and Code
Focus Area(s)
David Reynolds, One World Divisible: Global History since 1945
Libaria, 909.82 Rey
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan

Generally a good overall text
Henry C. Dethloff, The United States and the Global Economy since 1945
Libaria, 337.73 Det
United States prior to 1975
Sidney Pollard, The International Economy since 1945
Libaria, 940 Pol
Low inflation during the Golden Age of Capitalism (p.108)

Multinational Companies

Numbers for growth in passenger cars (p.21)


Updated 25 Nov 2011, Chen Weilun

Ronald Reagan-OPEC and the end of the Cold War

This is an entry to promote research US President Reagan's confrontational policies towards the USSR. Economically, it has been said that he persuaded OPEC to raise production to decrease oil prices. As the Soviet Union was an oil producer, this added to its economic strain on top of the grain embargo begun in 1979 by US president Carter for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The USSR was therefore deprived of funds to import technology and other goods. Reagan also banned technology transfer to the USSR. I recall that the US also restricted Japanese sales of computer technology to the USSR.

We can research on the numerical depth of the impact e.g. how much profits was lost. It is an interesting aspect of economic competition in the Cold War.

Chen Weilun

Thursday, October 13, 2011

Interesting Question on US, UN and International Terorrism

Preparing for the topic and questions on International Terrorism has enriched with me wider perspective.

According to some sources, for example Linda Fasulo in her book "An Insider's guide to the United Nations" (pg 79-81), she states that tackling international terrorism only began to "claim major attention" in the United Nations (UN) from the 1990s. The increased globalisation (flow of people, funds and weapons) and religious fundamentalism highlighted the need to clamp down on the trend. Apparently, the push came from the US particularly on one UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 targetting the Taliban of Afghanistan. Other academic sources also state that Western nations were generally not excessively concerned with the issue as domestic terrorists like the Red Brigade in Italy came under control by the 1980s. Domestic laws and enforcement had restricted the negative impact.  The implication for this is that there was no great will to overcome the problem through the UN since the West made up 3 of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council.

To verify the reliability and accuracy of the above information, I went to read Thomas M. Magstadt's "Understanding Politics: Ideas, Institution and Issues." A US government survey estimated international terrorist events in 1985 at 635 while another organisation Risk International gave a figure of more than 3000. (pg 446) This contextual information provides a clearer picture of how relatively insignificant the international terrorist problem was to the US. This is further corroborated by the increased terrorist attacks (actual or attempted) on US soil and property. There were a total of 11 such incidents in the 1990s alone. US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed for instance in 1998 with 224 killed. Therefore, it seems safe to argue that the US was indeed responding to the heightened terrorist threat which was starting to seem out of control. As it remained as a superpower, it was able to drive through such initiatives.

And now, perhaps one can go on and study the past approaches and attitudes of the US towards terrorism before 1990. I gather it would both be useful and interesting to discover US policy in this respect.

Mr Chen

Tuesday, June 7, 2011

Bali and indirect colonial rule in Southeast Asia; and the value of Persisting

It was challenging to find information on the above island. Eventually, I found it at the travel guide section in Sembawang National Library. This was after trying eResources of National Library Board; the internet; the History Sections of various libraries as well as the Political Science sections. Similar information was found in several travel guides and other books I read thereby suggesting that it was reliable. Therefore I am publishing this.
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Bali was conquered by the Dutch with the aid of Moluccan (islands east of Java) soldiers by 1908-10. According to the Bali & Lombok: Pocket Guide (Berlitz, Singapore, 2010), the end of the Balinese resistance was essentially suicide. This horrified the Dutch back in the Netherlands and colonialism remained indirect with the rajas (kings) remaining in place . Its economy like that of Cambodia and Laos remained largely intact (and unexploited); Bali became a tourist spot from the 1920s. Its culture was likewise put in exhibitions in Europe partly to justify colonialism. This was supported the lack of nationalist leaders In fact one of the royalty like Prince Madé (born 1919) who chose to be a doctor and was in Europe getting the degree during World War Two. He spent much of his time serving in his profession outside of Indonesia instead. (His father received a car from the Dutch for instance.)

Therefore, nationalism did not grow as quickly or as strongly in Bali as in Java. Arguably, there was relatively less resentment overall. This came on radically though in the 1940s. By 1946, Balinese led by Ngurah Rai were were killed resisting the returning Dutch. Today, several memorials highlight their resting place.

One can also suggest the same result in Malaya as it was governed with the Sultans remaining in place. This very much contrasted the removal of the Burmese kings who were patrons of Buddhism in Burma. This led to the Young Men's Buddhist Association which sought to revive Burman culture and religion and later on the organisation gave rise to the General Council of Burmese Associations, a clear nationalist group with desires for independence.

Nevertheless, the deficient sense of nationalism in Malaya can also be attributed to the lack of education overall. Different ethnic groups managed their own schools prior to the 1920s without much central direction in Malaya; from the 1930s there was reorganisation of state led education in states like Johor which increased education in Johor. Further, only after 1945 did "parents become aware of the importance of education." (P. Lim Pui Huen, Johor: Local History, Local Landscapes 1855 to 1957, Straits Times Press, p. 161). Thus, it can be said that a combination of such factors prevented the origins of nationalism especially on a large scale or mass basis.

Mr. Chen

Minorities and Migrants as a factor in Southeast Asian nationalism

Here the role of Malayan Chinese, Indonesia Chinese as well as Malayan Indians are discussed.

The Chinese in Indonesia as described by Leo Suryadinata in his book "Peranakan's Search fo National Identity: Biographical Studies of Seven Indonesian Chinese" (Marshall Cavendish International, 2004) were not united on the concept of Indonesia. Even when the Dutch returned after 1945, those who stayed in the Dutch areas either remained neutral or sided with the Dutch. Pro-Dutch groups included the Chinese Union (Persatuan Tionghoa) in Jarkarta. (Note that this was on the island of Java). The Chinese in the Indonesian Republic often supported the Sukarno and nationalists. Thus, the lack of a united nationalist front impeded faster independence.

Likewise this happened in Malaya. The Chinese by and large remained loyal to China rather than Malaya. Of note, it was not until 1930 that the Malayan Communist Party was set up. Of course, this was in part created by world economic conditions of fall in tin and rubber prices especially during the 1930s Great Depression. The British tried to send back those who lost jobs but refused to give permanent land rights to remaining Chinese who went into farming. The Indians faced even stiffer challenges as there were caste differences and strikes in the 1930s against the upper classes. These made up two of the 3 ethnic groups in Malaya itself.   

In sum, nationalism failed to rise and grow due to the above circumstances. It should be no wonder that in particular with Malaya, nationalism became much more apparent only after 1945.

Mr Chen

Friday, May 20, 2011

Vietnam: Nationalism and regionalism

Response to query from 1141B

The Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD), was a radical nationalist party during the colonial era of Vietnam. It was active in Tonkin. After their failed rebellion in the 1920s, they eventually fled to China. It only returned during World War Two. Unfortunately, it faced a rather established Indochinese Communist Party with a strong northern presence and failed to overcome them. Comparatively, other groups developed in Cochinchina like the Cao Dai starting from 1926. This was a religious organisation that grew up to 2 million strong with their own military arm; it began from Saigon city and was able to gain support from the peasantry (countryside). The Indochinese Communist Party led by Ho Chi Minh was not able to gain their support over the long term however and the Cao Dai ended up supporting the French after World War Two. Thus, one can see that regional differences and distance partly contributed to a weakened and disunited nationalist movement.

Mr Chen

Hungary and the Marshall Plan (1947)

Response to query from 1141B

Evidence suggests that Hungary, at least in the initial stages, like Poland and Czechosolovakia was interested in the Marshall Plan. However, eventually due to Soviet pressure and direction, all of them rejected the aid. Hence, the Marshall Plan led to economic division in the Cold War as the Soviet came up with the Molotov Plan and then COMECON.

See Hungary in the Cold War: 1945 -  1956 by Laszlo Borhi, Central European University Press, 2004, pg 122 (found on eBooks NLB eResources) and http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/128-5-130.shtml retrieved 20 May 2011.

Thursday, May 19, 2011

Q and A: Rise and Development of Southeast Asian Nationalism

Leave your questions here as comments to receive answers. There is no need to reveal your identity if you do not wish to do so. Good day.

Saturday, May 14, 2011

Q and A: Cold War

Good day,
                please pose questions by adding comments to this post for the above topic. You are required to include your name and class within the comment. All the best.


Mr Chen

Philippines in the Colonial Era (1900-1941)

Personally, I somehow have had a strong interest in the Philippines. I read about it though I was not taught in secondary school and later on, I grew concerned about the  poverty there.

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From a long term viewpoint, the Philippines had been colonised by the Spanish before the Americans took over. By there, unlike other Southeast Asian colonies, it was relatively developed in terms of nationalist thinking. Emilio Aguinaldo and his forces fought against the Americans, mostly through guerilla warfare till 1911.  Battling for full immediate independence for their nation-state, they nevertheless became the minority view. 

As Milton Osborne suggested in his book "Southeast Asia: An Introductory History" (9th edition, 2004, p.148), the colonisers and the colonised elites (upper class) trusted each other and had similar goals of gradual independence. This made for generally cordial relations and less repression. The evidence is provided by the following:

- first chief judge was a Filipino
- 1912, 50% of lower court judges were Filipinos; by 1926, only 2 out of 55 judges lower court  were American
- voting began from 1907; by 1916, the Jones Act replaced the 8 member American dominated commission (upper house in a bicameral parliament) into a democratically elected 24 member Senate, two of which represented non-Christian areas
- In 1936, the Commonwealth of Philippines was set up which gave locals control over nearly all domestic matters (Damien Kingsbury, South-east Asia: A political profile, 2nd edition, 2005, p.295).

The above thus showed a consistent movement towards independence occuring in 1946.

Acts of violence against the colonial regime therefore were less nationalistic than economic. The Americans wanted the Philippines to provide primary products for its economy. To achieve this, it needed to ensure a stable government and depended on the local landed elite since trade was largely controlled by the minority Chinese. Hence, the US enacted laws to stimulate agricultural exports. These included sugar and Manila hemp. It contributed to the number of tenant farmers doubling from 1900 to 1935. As such, there were 3 small scale rebellions on the island of Luzon during the 1920s and 30s. Yet, one must be reminded that this was within the context of "remarkably little manifestation of nationalist resentment." (Osborne, p.147)

Thence, the Japanese invasion far from being a turning point for Philippine nationalism, actually delayed independence.

[By: Mr Chen]

Monday, April 25, 2011

The End of the Cold War and Breakup of Yugoslavia

It is argued that the US lost interest in the political unity of Yugoslavia with the end of the Cold War. (Earlier among 3 reasons, Yugoslavia was in some ways a buffer for the West.) They therefore allowed the disintegration of the country. This led to more instability and violence in Europe.

See the report by Warren Zimmermann [distinguished fellow of the New School for Social Research, and a professorial lecturer in European studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. He has been a U.S. ambassador three times, including as chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting (1986-89), and as the last U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia (1989-92)]. It is found at this website: U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the Use of Force, Chapter 11: Yugoslavia 1989 - 1996, RAND Corporation, 1996. http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF129/CF-129.chapter11.html retrieved 25 Apr 2011. Please note the eBook is free for download!